I rst began to write about an idea I called "nation brand" in 1996. My original observation was a simple one: the reputations of countries (and, by extension, of cities and regions too) behave rather like the brand images of companies and products, and they are equally critical to the progress, prosperity, and good management of those places.
! essay on the subject in 1998, Nation Brands of the Twenty-First Century 1 , although the term "brand image" is a more precise one in this context).
Hence, one might suppose, "branding" must be related to one or another of these meanings: it is either the business of designing the livery of products (which is indeed what branding agencies do); or else it has something to do with building or creating an enhanced sense of corporate culture or mission within the organisation (in fact the word is not o en used in this context); or it is the means by which the product acquires its reputation, and this is where the trouble starts.
Used in its rst sense, branding actually does have some relevance to countries and the ways they present themselves to the rest of the world, but it is a humdrum business, which doesn't begin to justify the excitement about "nation branding. " Countries, through their many state agencies, have numerous dealings with various professional audiences around the world, and one can certainly argue that it gives a better impression of the country if all those agencies use consistent, well-designed materials when they carry out their transactions. A single logo, a professional "look and feel" on their stationery, business cards, corporate videos, information lea ets, communiqués, press releases, websites, and so forth, undoubtedly reinforces the impression of a well-organised, modern, self-respecting state with e ective and e cient structures, processes, and mechanisms. If this is nation branding then I withdraw all my objections: it's an eminently sensible, perfectly achievable standard to which to aspire; all countries should try to do it well; and it's certainly as important as, for example, making sure that diplomats o er the right kinds of canapés when entertaining foreign heads of state; but it's hard to understand why anybody in their right mind would want to spend time theorizing about it, still less write books about it.
e point is that branding in this sense of the term is essentially a passive operation. It can't win any new customers, change anybody's mind, increase market share, or a ect the country's prospects in any signi cant way. It is simply good practice, a useful exercise of reassurance, a piece of housekeeping.
Certainly, for low-cost, fast-moving consumer products in a busy retail environment, the branding (in this sense of graphic design or corporate identity) can be almost as important as the product itself, because design is one of the few things that distinguishes a product from its competitors; the attractiveness of the product and its wrapper may even be a more signi cant driver of consumer choice than advertising. is is why branding agencies, accustomed to the emphasis placed on brand identity in their native eld of commerce, talk so impressively about such matters, and public o cials are o en swayed by their talk. But countries aren't for sale, aren't easily mistaken one for another, aren't fast-moving consumer goods, and certainly don't come in wrappers, so the principles simply don't transfer. e real confusion starts when people want branding to mean a technique, or set of techniques, by means of which brand image is directly built or enhanced: "Nike's fantastic brand image is the result of fantastic branding. " It is not. Nike's fantastic brand image is the result of fantastic products sold in fantastically large numbers. Brand building is primarily achieved through product development and marketing and has relatively little to do with branding (except, as I mentioned before, if branding means logo and packaging design; in which case, it certainly helps the marketing process along). If people buy a product and nd it good, this will begin to create a powerful brand image for the product; the product will earn a good reputation. is reputation gradually spreads to non-users; even people who haven't bought the product will know that it's a good product. e reputation spreads, drives up sales, and increases the value of the corporation. It's one of the most signi cant factors of business success.
But the use of the term branding to imply a method for building brand equity is both incorrect and unjusti ablethere is simply no such method. Good products and services produced by a good corporation acquire a positive brand image, which eventually re ects on the corporation and becomes its principal asset. Similarly, good products, services, culture, tourism, investments, technology, education, businesses, people, policies, initiatives, and events produced by a good country also acquire a positive brand image, which eventually re ects on the country, and perhaps also becomes its principal asset. e message is clear: if a country is serious about enhancing its international image, it should concentrate on product development and marketing rather than chase a er the chimera of branding. ere are no short cuts. Only a consistent, coordinated, and unbroken stream of useful, noticeable, world-class, and above all relevant ideas, products, and policies can, gradually, enhance the reputation of the country that produces them.
I have o en summarised this process as consisting of three main components: strategy, substance, and symbolic actions. Strategy, in its simplest terms, is knowing who a nation is and where it stands today (both in reality and according to internal and external perceptions); knowing where it wants to get to; and knowing how it is going to get there. e two main di culties associated with strategy development are 1) reconciling the needs and desires of a wide range of di erent national actors into a more or less single direction and 2) nding a strategic goal that is both inspiring and feasible, since these two requirements are frequently contradictory.
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Substance is the e ective execution of that strategy in the form of new economic, legal, political, social, cultural, and educational activity: the real innovations, businesses, legislation, reforms, investments, institutions, and policies which will bring about the desired progress.
Symbolic actions are a particular species of substance that happen to have an intrinsic communicative power: they might be innovations, structures, legislation, reforms, investments, institutions, or policies that are especially suggestive, remarkable, memorable, picturesque, newsworthy, topical, poetic, touching, surprising, or dramatic. Most importantly, they are emblematic of the strategy: they are at the same time a component of the national story and the means of telling it. Some good examples of symbolic actions are the Slovenian government donating nancial aid to their Balkan neighbours in order to prove that Slovenia wasn't part of the Balkans; Spain legalising single-sex marriages in order to demonstrate that its values had modernised to a point diametrically opposed to the Franco period; the decision of the Irish government to exempt artists, writers, and poets from income tax in order to prove the state's respect for creative talent; Estonia declaring internet access to be a human right; or Bhutan charging a he y ne to visitors in order to demonstrate its great respect for its own cultural identity and for the fragility of its environment.
A single symbolic action will seldom achieve any lasting e ect. Multiple actions should emanate from as many di erent sectors as possible in order to build a rounded and believable image for the place; they must also continue in unbroken succession for many years. Symbolic actions should never be empty-they must be communicative substance rather than just communication. I argue that governments should never do things purely for brand-related reasons; no action should ever be conceived of or dedicated to image management or image change alone. Every initiative and action should rst and foremost be done for a real purpose in the real world, or else it runs the risk of being insincere, ine ective, and perceived as propaganda (not to mention a use of taxpayers' money that is o en extremely hard to justify).
It is clear that places require new and dedicated structures to coordinate, conceive, develop, maintain, and promote such an unbroken chain of proof. None of the traditional apparatus of trade or government is t for such a purpose.
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In order to sidestep the terminal confusion surrounding the notion of brands, I coined the deliberately unsexy term "competitive identity, " as the title of a book on this subject in 2007.
3 It probably compromised sales of the book, but it made the point that national image has more to do with national identity and the politics and economics of competitiveness than with branding as it is usually understood in the commercial sector (or as is usually meant by people who know nothing about it). Today, every place on earth appears to want to enhance, reverse, adapt, or otherwise manage its international reputation. Yet we are still far from a widespread understanding of what this means in practice and just how far commercial approaches can be e ectively and responsibly applied to government, society, and economic development. Many governments, most consultants, and even some scholars persist in a tiresome and super cial interpretation of "place branding" that is nothing more than standard product promotion, public relations, and corporate identity, where the product just happens to be a country, a city, or a region rather than a tin of beans or a box of soap powder.
e need for proper understanding in this area is crucial. Today, the world is one market. e rapid advance of globalisation means that whatever countries try to pull in (investors, aid, tourists, business visitors, students, major events, researchers, travel writers, and talented entrepreneurs) and whatever countries try to push out (products, services, policies, culture, and ideas) is done so with a discount if the country's image is weak or negative and at a premium if it's strong and positive.
In this crowded global marketplace, most people and organisations don't have time to learn much about other places. We all navigate through the complexity of the modern world armed with a few simple clichés, and they form the background of our opinions, even if we aren't fully aware of this and don't always admit it to ourselves: Paris is about style; Japan about technology; Switzerland about wealth and precision; Rio de Janeiro about carnival and football; Tuscany about the good life; and most African nations about poverty, corruption, war, famine, and disease. Most of us are much too busy worrying about ourselves and our own countries to spend too long trying to form complete, balanced, and informed views about six billion other people and nearly two hundred other countries. We make do with summaries for the vast majority of people and places -the ones we will probably never know or visit -and only start to expand and re ne these impressions when for some reason we acquire a particular interest in them. When you haven't got time to read a book, you judge it by its cover.
ese clichés and stereotypes-positive or negative, true or untrue-fundamentally a ect our behaviour towards other places and their people and products. It may seem unfair, but there's nothing anybody can do to change this. It's very hard for a country to persuade people in other parts of the world to go beyond these simple images and start to understand the rich complexity that lies behind them. Some quite progressive places don't get nearly as much attention, visitors, business, or ! investment as they need because their reputation is weak or negative, while others are still trading on a good image that they acquired decades or even centuries ago and today do relatively little to deserve.
So all responsible governments, on behalf of their people, their institutions, and their companies, need to measure and monitor the world's perception of their nation and to develop a strategy for managing it. It is a key part of their job to try to earn a reputation that is fair; true; powerful; attractive; genuinely useful to their economic, political, and social aims; and honestly re ective of the spirit, the genius, and the will of the people. is huge task has become one of the primary skills of administrations in the twenty-rst century.
When it comes into o ce, a government inherits a sacred responsibility for its electorate's most valuable asset: the good name of its country. Its task is to hand that good name down to its successors in at least as good condition as it received it.
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President Lee Myung-Bak of the Republic of Korea is one leader who appears to have taken this responsibility seriously and has identi ed the task of improving South Korea's rather weak performance in the Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brands Index™ (NBI) as a particularly important challenge for the country's future success and prosperity.
South Korea is an interesting case. is is a country which, by any account, has made remarkable progress during the last three decades, achieving great advances in prosperity, stability, transparency, productivity, education, and in many other important areas. e 'Korean Wave' of high-quality lm, music and television has made Korea into something of a media star in East and South-East Asia, yet its image remains decidedly weak, if not actually negative, outside the region. Research suggests that people in many countries aren't even quite sure which of the two Koreas is the good one and which the bad oneor whether perhaps they are both bad.
e reason why Korea has a weak international image is not, of course, because it has spent too little money on promoting itself. It's because most people in most other countries simply aren't interested in Korea, any more than they are interested in Peru, Jordan, Estonia, or Namibia. And there is, currently, no compelling reason why they should be.
Most people in most countries aren't even very interested in their own country, let alone the two hundred or so other countries around the world. ey are interested in their own lives, their own families, their own neighbourhood. Perhaps they sometimes think about America or China or Afghanistan or some other country that's regularly in the news. Perhaps they occasionally give a thought to their neighbouring countries, another country where friends or relatives live, or another country they would like to visit one day as tourists or migrant workers or students. But the idea that large numbers of people in Europe, the Americas, South Asia or anywhere else would spend time thinking about South Korea is, at least at the moment, merely fantasy.
Korea could spend a hundred billion or a trillion won on promoting its image, and it still wouldn't make itself relevant to the daily lives of foreigners. e cutest logo in the world can't make people admire a country that has no relevance to them: governments might as well burn the money.
Tourism promotion-it should be stressed-is a di erent matter. is is primarily about selling a product to a consumer, rather than trying to change people's minds about a country, and advertising is a legitimate and proven method to achieve this.
In one sense, despite all the mystique and complexity surrounding the concept of nation branding, the basic principle is actually a very simple one, and it comes from marketing: the consumer wants to know "what's in it for me?" At this basic level, it is clear that a country's achievements for its own population, its successes and its prosperity, will never automatically result in any kind of enhanced reputation, simply because they don't bene t the (foreign) consumer.
I was consequently all the more delighted to hear See-jeong Chang, Director of the Korea International Cooperation Agency, announce at the Jeju Peace Forum in 2009 that it was Korea's intention to increase its overseas development assistance to 0.25% of GNI by 2015. is means that Korea is still a long way from joining the tiny club of nations that have met the United Nation's recommendation of 0.7% of GNI, but it is certainly better than either the United States or Japan have achieved in recent years. Clearly a country can't simply buy itself a better reputation by spending more money on poverty reduction, but the voluntary increase is a powerful symbolic gesture that Korea is ready and prepared to start making a serious contribution to the issues that matter to humanity-and not just to Koreans.
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education, corruption, terrorism, crime, war, and arms control are just a few of the most obvious ones. It's hard to imagine any country that couldn't pick at least one item on this list with a special relevance to its own needs or resources and nd a way to make a prominent, thoughtful, meaningful, and memorable contribution to the debate and to the global e ort.
ere is a strong precedent for this kind of behaviour in the commercial world. For the past twenty years or so, it has become more and more evident that corporations that fail to demonstrate and maintain high ethical standards, transparency, and social responsibility will soon lose the trust and respect of their consumers. e critics of corporate social responsibility claim that the approach has become devalued because, in many cases, it is no more than window-dressing. But, in the face of such attempts at free-riding, the media and consumers naturally tend to increase scrutiny and demand higher standards, reducing the opportunities for corporations to get away with greenwash or empty propaganda. Corporations are at last being forced to treat their social responsibilities as a matter for the board rather than for the PR agency. Surely the basic principle here is no di erent from the one I underlined earlier in this chapter: in order to achieve a better reputation, as Socrates is said to have observed, we must endeavour to be as we desire to appear. In other words, it is necessary to provide people with proof of one's virtues. If the price of consumer respect is continuous and tangible evidence of corporate responsibility rather than pious statements, so much the better for everyone.
But if one is cynical and believes that 75 percent of organisations that preach the triple bottom line are merely window-dressing, still, the fact that a quarter of all those companies have fundamentally reviewed the ways, means, causes, and e ects of doing business, and have cleaned up their act as a result, is revolutionary.
What a revolution it would be if countries, cities, and regions, nowadays as obsessed with the value of their reputations as companies are, were to follow the same principles.
It is already clear from the Nation Brands Index data that more and more people in more and more countries feel unable to admire or respect countries or governments that pollute the planet, practise or permit corruption, trample human rights, or out the rule of law: in other words, it's the same audience starting to apply the same standards to countries as they apply to companies.
In just a few decades, consumer power has changed the rules of business and transformed the behaviour of corporations almost beyond recognition. It doesn't seem unreasonable to hope that consumer power might achieve a similar transformation in the way that countries, cities, and regions are run in the years to come.
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e potential gains from pursuing ethical policies are of course matched by the corresponding risks of failing to pursue them. Italy, for example, has the sixth best national image in the world, according to the Nation Brands Index, coming up top for tourism and second for culture. Its ranking is only let down by rather poor scores for business and governance, as one might perhaps expect.
And yet there is a worrying undercurrent when one looks more closely at Italy's rankings over the last few years. Not only is it the most volatile of any Top 10 country in the Index, but it is also in steady decline. Italy's rankings have dropped by 2.3% since the questionnaire of the Nation Brands Index was stabilised in the last quarter of 2005-which may not sound much, but at this rate Italy will have a weaker image than Mexico in ten years' time.
It seems pretty clear that Italy's brand is not actually declining in absolute terms. e reason why Italy's NBI scores are falling so fast is because the world is changing its mind on a number of issues, and Italy is being very gradually "squeezed out" of the new scenario. As the Nation Brands Index has abundantly proved over the years, country images are normally remarkably stable, and barely change from year to year. What Italy seems to be facing is not a loss of attraction in its image, but a decline in the relevance of that image for many people: in other words, Italy seems to be going out of fashion.
Tellingly, one of the areas where Italy is increasingly failing to make a connection with global public opinion is in the area of its environmental standards and commitment: worse than being perceived as just another country that isn't doing very much about climate change, it is perceived as a country with a hugely important natural and cultural heritage that isn't doing enough to look a er it.
Italy isn't the only country whose image is su ering as a result of such a perception; it drags down China's and America's images too (and China's image is dragged down even more markedly by its weak scores for governance and human rights). America's scores in most areas have improved dramatically since President Obama took o ce, but it remains to be seen whether this blip of hope will prove durable or not.
Are we observing the rst victims of a consumer power revolution? It is, of course, too early to say; but there is no question that international public opinion is beginning to emerge as a formidable new player in the complex equation of international relations and sovereign power.
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e fundamental problem of sovereignty is that national leaders, assuming they care about public opinion at all, care most about the opinions of their own populations; even if they aren't elected leaders, this is simple self-interest. And when their national interest is at odds with the national interest of other states, governments will invariably focus on pleasing their electorate at the expense of pleasing foreign populations; indeed, populist politicians such as Mahmoud Ahmedinejad and Hugo Chávez sometimes rely on displeasing certain foreign publics in order to enhance their domestic appeal.
But it may not be too naïve to hope that things are slowly changing, and the paradox may be starting to resolve itself. As more and more of the issues that governments face today cut across national sovereignty (of the long list of important topics which I mentioned earlier, from climate change to arms control, none are respecters of national boundaries), as national governments are held more and more to account by their own populations for these shared challenges, as those populations feel more and more closely connected through shared issues with populations in other countries, it becomes harder for leaders to pursue radically di erent agendas from those of the international community. e tragedy of the commons may not, a er all, be destined to be a tragedy forever.
A kind of common morality shapes the (very rough) boundaries of what is deemed acceptable behaviour in most parts of the world today. A morality characterised by human rights, environmentalism, the rule of law, anti-colonialism, democracy, and free market economics; whilst the universality of these values is, quite rightly, under constant scrutiny and discussion, there is no denying a sense of basic consensus on at least some of the principal ones. e governments today that appear not to mind being regarded as moral outsiders by international public opinion, or who don't see the need to maintain a positive national image, can almost be counted on the ngers of two hands.
Acquiring the support, or at least avoiding the censure, of public opinion in other countries is also driven by the emergence of more and more regional and multilateral groupings. Most governments of E.U. member states, for example, would prefer to avoid incurring public disapproval elsewhere in the European Union if they can help it, since it reduces their ability to support their own country's interests, and similar e ects occur within other multilateral clubs such as NATO, ASEAN and MERCOSUR.
For developing countries that are dependent on foreign aid, being seen as worthy recipients of that aid is an essential precondition of their continuing to receive it; donor governments cannot long continue to donate their taxpayers' money to regimes or countries with very weak or very negative brand images. e willingness of China to extend enormous amounts of aid without regard to such matters has considerably upset the delicate moral balance in this area; but there are signs that the same mechanisms are, gradually, having the e ect of bringing China into line with the views of the moral majority too -for, of course, China itself depends on the approval of international public opinion in order to maintain the health of its allimportant exports.
One way or another, it seems that governments nd international public approval ever more worth their while to value, to seek, and to retain, and the mechanism of shared values and reciprocal esteem appears to function better with each decade that passes. Just as in the corporate sphere, earning and maintaining a good reputation is becoming the cost of entry into the marketplace; survival outside that marketplace is no longer an option.
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So the last thing, it seems to me, most countries should want is a brand. If a brand image is the catchy reduction of something rich and complex into a simple, naive, one-dimensional formula, then many of the countries which already have one would probably do better to get rid of it. Nation branding is surely the problem, not the solution: branding is what the media and public opinion do to countries, not what governments should try to do to their own states and populations. What countries need is for people around the world to have a richer, deeper, more complex, more nuanced, more democratic, more chaotic, more human view of their land, their population and their civilisation-not a fabricated stereotype to replace the inherited stereotype.
Why else did Egyptian respondents' scores for Denmark drop thirty-six places in the Nation Brands Index following the publication of a handful of cartoons, while their scores for America never fell further than six, despite the invasion and military occupation of two Muslim countries? Because Denmark had a simple brand image, while America moved beyond a brand centuries ago. Most Egyptians only knew one thing about Denmark-that it was a Scandinavian country-so they admired it; then they learned one new thing-that it had insulted their Prophet-so y percent of its image became negative, and they hated it. By contrast, Egyptians knew thousands of things about America, so one new negative fact only formed a small proportion of the whole, and in icted only limited damage on this very large idea.
What most countries should be attempting is surely more like education than branding: to nd ways of helping people in other countries to get to know them, to increase and celebrate rather than reduce their own complexity. is is one reason why I have claimed that cultural relations is the only demonstrably e ective form of nation branding I have ever !"#$%&'()"&* encountered. e experience of countries that have successfully practised cultural relations over many years shows that consistent, imaginative cultural exchange does eventually create an environment where respect and tolerance ourish, and this undoubtedly also favours increased trade in skills, knowledge, products, capital, and people. People who understand each other tend to get on better, and people who get on better tend to trade with each other more frequently, more freely and with greater mutual pro t.
I remember hearing about a study carried out in Iraq some years a er the United States/United Kingdom invasion, in which young Iraqis were questioned about their attitudes towards the presence of British soldiers in Baghdad: some 99 percent of those interviewed expressed strong antipathy to their presence, but 1% had much more favourable views. It turned out that this 1 percent corresponded almost exactly to individuals who had used the British Council Library in Baghdad. If you know people through understanding and sharing their culture, it's hard to hate them. You can sometimes hate what they do, but that's in nitely easier to deal with and to recover from.
Of course, extending the reach of the cultural relations e ect beyond the unavoidably limited number of individuals that the country's cultural centres can engage with directly is a challenge. It's slow work, one individual at a time, and requires enormous numbers of highly trained and highly dedicated people to achieve.
One of the most important aspects of cultural relations is that cultural promotion is never entirely satisfactory either for the sender or the receiver. Nobody likes having another nation's cultural habits or achievements thrust upon their attention: what the British Council has learned to stress over the last eighty years is the importance of mutuality.
is principle is based on the observation that people who like culture like to engage in culture, so rather than being expected to admire another nation's culture, it is much more rewarding, much more exciting, and much more e ective for two nations to do culture together. Engagement is invariably more productive than promotion; listening an indispensable adjunct to talking; and if you want something from somebody, it is only reasonable to ask what they want from you.
Such groundwork is the essential, indispensible, and irreplaceable means of resolving, avoiding, and mitigating hatred and ignorance between peoples. Where culture is the problem, culture is also the solution. is seems to me so much safer and more valuable a way of increasing understanding between nations than the rather risky game of reducing a country's history, culture, and population to an infantile stereotype, and then discharging it at other nations as if from a gun.
You will have your di erences with other cultures, of course, but against a background of ignorance those di erences will nd their expression in protectionism and isolation at best; an indoctrination, hatred, and violence at worst. Against a background of understanding and respect, di erences remain harmless mysteries at worst and the source of highly fruitful relationships at best-the mingling of opposites and the chaos of cultural diversity being the most creative and productive power on earth.
As I wrote in an article in 2006, "if the world's governments placed even half the value which most wise corporations have learned to place on their good names, the world would be a safer and quieter place than it is today. " 4 I think we have reason to feel hopeful that this dynamic, notwithstanding the almost chronic pessimism of the commentariat today, is starting to make things better.
